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Introduction
On 13 September 2016, the Standing Committee of the NationalPeople’s Congress (NPCSC) held an extraordinary meeting and an-nounced a decision unprecedented in the history of People’s Re-
public of China (PRC). It disqualified 45 out of 102 delegates to the National
People’s Congress (NPC) elected from the Liaoning’s People’s Congress (LPC)
for massive election fraud in the election of these delegates back in January
2013. The disqualification also resulted in removing 38 of the 62 members
of the LPC Standing Committee, making the body short of the quorum re-
quired to convene meetings. Of the 523 (out of a total of 619) members of
the LPC who were implicated in the vote-buying scandal, 453 resigned and
one was sacked from their positions in the LPC. (1) The NPCSC later organ-
ised a “preparatory panel” to arrange a re-election of new members for the
LPC. Due to the unprecedented nature of the non-functional LPC, the
NPCSC was required to handle the situation through an “innovative arrange-
ment” (chuangzhi xing anpai 创制性安排). (2) The president of the NPCSC,
Zhang Dejiang, framed the incident as “touching the bottom line of the so-
cialist system with Chinese characteristics,” (3) and the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) also pinpointed in a circular that the incident was a “serious vi-
olation of party discipline” and “serious destruction of the electoral system
of the People’s Congress.” (4) Some media highlighted the news by labelling
it a “case of paramount importance” (tian zi yi hao an 天字一号案). Of the
45 disqualified NPC delegates, 40 are private industrial entrepreneurs, four
are executives of state-owned enterprises, and one is a public servant. (5)
The majority of disqualified members with business backgrounds also points
to the noticeable presence of business tycoons in the NPC. This paper in-
tends to describe Liaoning’s election fraud and its consequences in detail,
put it in the context of Xi Jinping’s Administration, and discuss its implica-
tions for the party-business relationship and elections in China.
The People’s Congress system under Xi
Jinping
Like the National Party Congress of the CCP, the People’s Congress system
(the PC system) in the PRC is underscored by the principle of “democratic
centralism.” As the full assembly of the PC is only in session for several
weeks in a year, the standing committee holds de facto power to execute
legislative duties the rest of the time. However, the existence of the CCP
alongside the PC system has long formed an informal power locus that de-
cisively influences the operation of the PC system through the Party group
(dangzu 党组) in the standing committee. (6) Members of the Party group
are subordinate to directives and orders from their superiors in the CCP. The
implication of this party-state fusion is that the PC system is heavily dic-
tated by a few Party members in the standing committees at the various
PC levels. (7)
With regards to the election of PC delegates, members of the PC below
the county level are elected by direct election. The PCs above the county
level have their members elected from the PCs at the immediate-lower
level, constituting the element of indirect election in the PC system. It
is, however, no secret that the CCP attempts to control the electoral
process through managing the list of nominated candidates and to drive
off independent candidates who are not sponsored by the CCP. (8) How-
ever, such control has become less absolute since the introduction of
the “candidate-more-than-post” system (cha’e xuanju, 差额选举 ) in
1982, which introduced a slight degree of uncertainty to the overall
electoral process. 
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Among many other functions, the PC serves to represent Chinese nation-
als from various geographical regions as well as an array of sectors, including
peasants, workers, women, ethnic minorities, intelligentsia, and Returned
Overseas Chinese. At the national level, the eight “democratic parties,” the
People’s Liberation Army, and representatives from Hong Kong, Macau, and
“Taiwan” are also included. Regional representation is manifested in the
ways delegates are elected and PC meetings are organised. (9) Also, the
higher-level PC is responsible for allotting and approving the representation
quotas for the above-mentioned sectors in the PC of the immediate-lower
level, as stipulated in the Election Law. At the national level, Party leaders
have at least two ways to ensure that the candidates they sponsor become
NPC delegates. First, the NPCSC can centrally assign (zhongyang fenpei 中
央分配) candidates to the provincial groups of delegates in the name of
making the NPC more comprehensively representative. (10) Second, Qin
Qianhong points out that the majority of delegates to the NPC are usually
pre-selected by the CCP’s Organisation Department and United Front De-
partment at both the national and provincial levels, after consultation with
the standing committee of the provincial PC in question. The two depart-
ments will use their own measures to ensure that CCP-endorsed candidates
are elected. (11) The representation quotas and the list of pre-selected can-
didates are supposed to serve as a dictate for the provincial PC’s standing
committee when it administers the election of its delegates to the NPC. 
Nonetheless, the PC system is not an outright top-down administrative
system where Party leaders can assert full control. The NPC does not actu-
ally lead (lingdao 领导) the provincial ones and tell what to do on all issues.
There is indeed a limited degree of autonomy for provincial PCs, especially
after the significant reform of the PC system introduced immediately after
the Cultural Revolution. (12) Given the practical autonomy of provincial PCs,
conflicts might arise between them and the NPC. Informal mechanisms
such as guanxi (personal connection) between PC delegates at the two lev-
els and the CCP’s rules that govern the behaviour of Party group members
in their respective standing committees become important complements
to the operation and coordination of the overall PC system. (13)
Indeed, election fraud is not uncommon in the PC system. (14) Although
only a few seats are left for competition under the “candidate-more-than-
post” system, many vote-buying practices take place in this part of the elec-
toral process. (15) The results of the Liaoning election in January 2013
particularly infuriated the Party leaders under Xi Jinping’s leadership because
some of the representation quotas reserved for peasants and grassroots
representatives set by the NPCSC were not observed, and 11 candidates
for NPC delegates shortlisted by Party leaders were not elected, but were
substituted by candidates who allegedly bribed their way into office. (16)
Given the lack of observance of the Centre’s orders and the sheer scale of
the election fraud in the LPC, the Party Centre carried out investigations on
the possible involvement of the then chairman of the Standing Committee
of the LPC, Wang Min 王珉, and other leading cadres in the vote-buying
scandal.
The lack of observance of the Centre’s orders can be understood in the
changing political context under the Xi Administration. Since Xi Jinping has
become Party leader, a number of “flies” and “tigers” within the Party have
been prosecuted on the grounds of graft and violations of party discipline.
The fall of senior Party cadres such as Zhou Yongkang and Ling Jihua is in-
evitably re-making the power dynamic among the various factions within
the Party. In the shadow of the anti-graft campaign and intense intra-party
factional struggle, Chen Ling and Barry Naughton argue that what is ex-
pected from local cadres has departed from previous Party norms, making
the criteria for cadres’ promotion less clear and cadres’ careers more un-
predictable. (12) The failure of Liaoning’s provincial cadres to observe the Cen-
tre’s orders in the election of delegates to the NPC, and their reluctance to
remedy the situation in accordance with the central authorities’ instructions
at a later time, suggest that the CCP’s informal mechanisms to control local
cadres might not be as effective under the Xi Administration, and that it
has offered greater leeway for unapproved business tycoons to advance
their interests up to the national level of the PC system.
Re-making Party discipline in Liaoning
Province 
To investigate the extent of corruption in Liaoning Province, the Central
Inspection Group (Zhongyang xunshi zu 中央巡视组) was dispatched to the
province in 2014. The subsequent investigation report criticised provincial
Party leaders for failing to apprehend the complexity of the PC election and
asked them to rectify the situation. (18) Without satisfying Party leaders, the
Party head of Liaoning Province, Wang Min, was transferred to the post of
deputy director of the NPC’s Education, Culture, and Public Health Com-
mittee. After a second round of investigation by the Central Inspection
Group during February and April 2016, a new Central Case Examination
Group (Zhongyang zhuan’anzu 中央专案组) was formed to follow up the
investigation of election fraud, and more than 100 PC delegates and Party
cadres were interviewed. (19) In August, Wang Min was officially expelled
from the Party, followed by an official document that charged him with
criticising the Party Centre (wang yi zhongyang 妄议中央), lacking party
discipline after knowing he could not fulfil his personal political aspirations,
and showing negligence in the massive election fraud in the LPC. (20) Mean-
while, a number of key Party cadres were also expelled from the Party from
June to August 2016, namely, the former deputy directors of the 12th Stand-
ing Committee of the LPC, Wang Yang 王阳 and Zheng Yuchao 郑玉焯, and
former Standing Committee member Su Hongzhang 苏宏章. They were re-
ported to be associated with not only the scandal in the 2013 election of
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the LPC delegates to the NPC, but also other election scandals that might
have helped them to gain office in the provincial legislature. In September,
the former secretary of the Standing Committee Party group, Li Feng 李峰,
was dismissed from his position in the LPC for negligence in the election
fraud, a treatment unlike the 453 LPC delegates who resigned at the same
time. The former Party head of the Discipline Committee of Liaoning
Province, Wang Junlian王俊莲, also received a warning despite her retire-
ment, and appeared on television to repent her negligence in the LPC elec-
tion fraud as part of the Central Committee’s effort to showcase its
achievements in fighting corruption. As of 6 January 2017, there were 955
people under investigation or receiving punishment. (21)
For Xi Jinping, the large-scale re-shuffle of Party cadres in Liaoning
Province could serve as a strong warning to others who dare to put personal
interests above party discipline in the run-up to the 19th National Party
Congress. Steve Tsang argues that the upcoming National Party Congress is
crucial for Xi’s strategic manoeuvring for political succession and his selec-
tion of trustworthy allies, especially after his anti-graft campaign displeased
a number of factions in the Party. (22) At the 6th Plenum of the 18th CCP Na-
tional Party Congress in November 2016, Xi Jinping openly warned of “po-
litical conspiracies of working with ostensible obedience while forming
cliques to pursue selfish interests” among senior Party cadres. (23) In light of
his statement, it remains to be seen to what extent Xi Jinping as the “Party
core” will be able to assert control over local Party cadres.
Private entrepreneurs in the People’s
Congress system
Following the gradual development of the private sector since the eco-
nomic reforms, the CCP has a complex relationship with the rising number
of private entrepreneurs. For example, since the 1990s, a number of CCP
cadres and their families became “red capitalists” who owned private firms
converted from state-owned enterprises. In 2001, Jiang Zemin proposed the
theory of “Three Represents,” which officially allowed private entrepreneurs
to join the Party. Scholars argue that this move was an attempt to justify
the previously informal existence of “red capitalists” and to pre-emptively
diffuse their potential to become an organised force against the CCP. (24)
Moreover, it has been long observed that Party cadres and private en-
trepreneurs have developed intricate webs of guanxi for mutual benefit, (25)
manifested in various informal patronage alliances crosscutting the line be-
tween the public and private sectors. (26) Their collusion, however, often in-
volves illegal activities such as corruption and embezzlement of state
assets. (27)
Private entrepreneurs have also been granted representation in the NPC
and National People’s Political Consultative Conference (NPPCC) since the
1990s. According to calculations by Southern Weekly in 2010, about 9% of
the delegates in the 11th NPC (2008-2013) were owners of private enter-
prises. (28) According to the Shanghai-based Hurun Research Institute, about
15% of private entrepreneurs on the China’s Rich List were members of ei-
ther the NPC or NPPCC from 2010 to 2013, and as much as 30-40% of the
50 richest private entrepreneurs in China were also NPC/NPPCC delegates
from 2010 to 2014. (29)
The reasons for private entrepreneurs to pursue a formal title in the PC
system could be manifold. Chen Youxi argues that while local private en-
trepreneurs looked for informal political patronage from local Party secre-
taries for rent-seeking and political protection, the benefit obtained from
guanxi is not solid because private entrepreneurs face the risk of policy re-
versal when new Party secretaries assume office. (30) In the absence of de
facto legal protection of private property, their business interests in a lo-
cality could also be susceptible to abuse of power by local Party cadres
through the judiciary or simply through coercive force. (31) Jiang Mingan ob-
serves that private entrepreneurs might also use their privileges as PC del-
egates to meddle in court cases related to them, given the constitutional
right of the PC to oversee the judiciary at the same level. (32) All these point
to the advantages of holding a PC office in the formal political system be-
sides the cultivation of guanxi.
Some observers also note that the specific economic structure of Liaoning
Province could be one of the reasons for private entrepreneurs to aspire to
PC positions that protect their business interests. As Liaoning’s economy
comprises predominantly state-owned enterprises in heavy industries with
a relatively underdeveloped private sector, most resources are in the hands
of government officials, rendering political connections a necessity for pri-
vate entrepreneurs in the province. (33) The formal position of PC delegate
not only gives private entrepreneurs a greater sense of security for their
business interests, but also allows more guanxi to be nurtured with govern-
ment officials.
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In addition, scholars argue that private entrepreneurs are more eager than
before to make political connections with government officials at the na-
tional level, as it helps them to obtain resources beyond their localities as
well as more stable political protection from the central government. (34) In
the case of Liaoning’s election fraud, the profiles of some disqualified NPC
delegates suggest that they have business interests beyond the Northeast
region. (35) Also, specific to the Northeast region, the central government
launched a strategic economic revival programme (Zhenxing dongbei 振兴
东北) in 2004 to rescue the declining economy there. However, many revival
measures have not been properly implemented by the local government in
Liaoning Province. (36) Business tycoons from Liaoning Province might want
to gain the post of NPC delegate in order to have more direct access to na-
tional government officials and thus resources. The incentives and the fi-
nancial capacity of Business tycoons to buy NPC positions, coupled with
provincial cadres’ insubordination to the Centre’s orders for personal benefit
in the opaque electoral process of the PC system, constitute the background
of the incident of Liaoning’s election fraud.
New formulation of the Party-business
relationship
In order to harness the growing role of the private sector in economic de-
velopment and to rid the process of corrupt behaviour, Xi Jinping in March
2016 urged Party cadres to cooperate closely with private enterprise (qin
亲) but also to be clean of corruption (qing 清), forging what Xi called “the
new Party-business relationship” (Xinxing zhengshang guanxi 新型政商关
系). He asked Party cadres to help private entrepreneurs without a mind for
corruption or personal gain, and for private entrepreneurs to better com-
municate with Party cadres and operate businesses in a legal manner. (37)
Some related measures are observed. First, the Xi Administration issued
guidelines (Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu wanshan chanquan
baohu zhidu yifa baohu chanquan de yijian 中共中央国务院关于完善产权
保护制度依法保护产权的意见) in November 2016 that include ten specific
measures to offer private entrepreneurs greater legal protection of their pri-
vate property. Hu Shuli also points out that the guidelines show a more tol-
erant attitude towards assets of private entrepreneurs who accumulated
their wealth illegally in the early days of economic reform, a major concern
among private entrepreneurs. (38) As noted by Minxin Pei, many business ty-
coons actually acquired their wealth through corrupt guanxi with govern-
ment officials or by cooperating with the latter to loot the assets of
state-owned enterprises in the 1990s. (39) Despite the effort to build up a
stronger legal framework for the protection of private property, potential
resistance by local governments to redress private-property cases in court
could cast doubt on the effectiveness of the guidelines, (40) and long-stand-
ing guanxi between local Party cadres who are accustomed to bribery and
private entrepreneurs who have rent-seeking impulses might also discredit
the usefulness of the legal framework in achieving the new Party-business
relationship Xi envisions.
Moreover, the CCP continues to be in close contact with private en-
trepreneurs through its united front work as a means of control and feed-
back collection. In 2015, the CCP promulgated a new regulation (Zhongguo
Gongchandang tongyizhanxian gongzuo tiaoli (shixing) 中国共产党统一战
线工作条例（试行）), which outlined two business-related categories of
the 12 united front work targets for internal reference. (41) While the co-op-
tation of the super-rich into the NPC remains an objective of united front
work under the Xi Administration, subtle changes have occurred in their
representation in the NPC. Since 2013, representation quotas have been
increased for some traditional sectors such as women, peasants, and work-
ers. (42) Concurrently, there has been a decline in the proportion of private
entrepreneurs with the title of NPC delegate on the expanding China Rich
List, which dropped from 8.2% in 2013 to 4.8% in 2016. This shows that
the CCP’s co-optation strategy by way of NPC membership has not
matched the rapid rise of the newly rich in China. (43) Put together, they sug-
gest that Party leaders may not want to see the NPC as an arena in which
wealthy private entrepreneurs are co-opted as much as before, and certainly
cannot tolerate private entrepreneurs who bribe their way into positions in
the formal political system against the strategic planning of Party leaders,
as in the case of Liaoning’s election fraud. 
Concluding remarks
The incident of Liaoning’s election fraud in 2013 shows us how provincial
Party cadres exhibited insubordination to their Party leaders in an electoral
arrangement, resulting in the seizure of NPC positions by private en-
trepreneurs not pre-approved by Party leaders. The open sacking of senior
Party cadres in Liaoning Province through informal party rules as well as
the massive disqualification of LPC delegates by formal legislative proce-
dures ought to be considered remedial measures by the central Party leaders
to strengthen political control over Liaoning Province in the context of the
anti-graft campaign and intense intra-party factional struggle. The disqual-
ification of 45 NPC delegates from Liaoning Province, of which private en-
trepreneurs comprise a majority, does not signal a termination of the
symbiotic relationship between the CCP and business tycoons, but re-af-
firms the Party’s leadership as paramount in the Party-business relationship.
Under the Xi Administration, it is noticeable that Party leaders are willing
to keep the super-rich in the PC system as allies in economic development.
Yet, the protection of their interests is perhaps not granted predominantly
through the expansion of formal political positions in the NPC on par with
their rapid rise in number, but more so through the informal channels of
united front work and promised legal protection of their property rights in
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return for their continued loyalty to the Party amidst economic downturn
and a re-shuffling of their political allies within the Party. The unprecedented
action by the NPCSC to eradicate election fraud in both the NPC and the
LPC should not be mistaken for refining the quality of elections in a more
democratic direction, nor should this move be regarded as propelled by the
fear of Party leaders that private entrepreneurs pose a real threat to the
CCP’s monopoly of power, as it is highly unlikely that private entrepreneurs
could or would organise to oppose the CCP as a unified group. (44) Rather, it
is more like an attempted “revolution from above” (45) to ensure the domi-
nance of the CCP over wealthy private entrepreneurs and the supremacy
of the Secretary General over the Party in both the formal and informal pol-
itics of the socialist political system.
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